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Abstract. The analysis and value of digital evidence in an investigation has been 
the domain of discourse in the digital forensic community for several years. While 
many works have considered different approaches to model digital evidence, a 
comprehensive understanding of the process of merging different evidence items 
recovered during a forensic analysis is still a distant dream. With the advent of 
modern technologies, pro-active measures are integral to keeping abreast of all 
forms of cyber crimes and attacks. This paper motivates the need to formalize the 
process of analyzing digital evidence from multiple sources simultaneously. In this 
paper, we present the forensic integration architecture (FIA) which provides a 
framework for abstracting the evidence source and storage format information 
from digital evidence and explores the concept of integrating evidence information 
from multiple sources. The FIA architecture identifies evidence information from 
multiple sources that enables an investigator to build theories to reconstruct the 
past. FIA is hierarchically composed of multiple layers and adopts a technology 
independent approach. FIA is also open and extensible making it simple to adapt 
to technological changes. We present a case study using a hypothetical car theft 
case to demonstrate the concepts and illustrate the value it brings into the field. 
1   Introduction 
In a digital investigation, investigators deal with acquiring digital data for examina-
tion. Digital records can vary in forms and types. Documents on a computer, telephone 
contact list, list of all phone calls made, trace of signal strengths from base station of a 
mobile phone, recorded voice and video files, email conversations, network traffic pat-
terns and virus intrusions and detections are all examples of different types of digital 
records. Digital investigations must also contend with new challenges introduced by 
electronic equipment such as different devices, processor types, operating systems, sto-
rage formats and processing mechanisms that are used to store records in numerous for-
mats. For the sake of this discussion, we restrict the classification of digital evidence to 
its source, data semantics and storage formats. We classify digital evidence based on its 
source, such as hard disks, volatile memory, or network traffic, its logical representation 
that defines its storage format and the type of information that can be extracted from the 
source which determines the evidence semantics. No digital investigation is complete 
without an elaborate and systematic analysis along all three dimensions identified above. 
A variety of new digital devices are being introduced with rapid advances in digital 
technology. Coping with such advances has become challenging owing to the use of 
proprietary data structures and protocols in most devices rendering them difficult for 
interpretation without relevant documentation, let alone, in a forensically sound manner. 
The large volumes of data collected in typical cases can be attributed to this variety and 
sifting through them can be enormously time consuming. Although digital forensics is in 
its early stages, there is a definite need to categorize digital evidence. This categorization 
is expected to limit the investigation space and minimize the effort spent on examining a 
variety of digital evidence. 
From a forensic standpoint, there is too much entropy in the forensic examination 
process to capture all data and process it in one go. There is a need for capturing, under-
standing and analyzing information from disparate digital sources uniformly. Cohen [7] 
describes the PyFlag network forensic architecture, which is an open-source effort in 
providing a common framework for integrating forensic analysis from diverse digital 
sources. While PyFlag does support multiple image types and formats, it can only mount 
and examine one image at a time. PyFlag, thus, sorely lacks an architecture such as the 
one described in this paper to make the analysis more cohesive. As a first step to provid-
ing a common forensic analysis framework, this paper presents the architecture for inte-
grating evidence information from different sources irrespective of the logical type of its 
contents.  
Turner [19] states that as devices become more specialized, forensic examiners will 
require acquaintance with as many different processing tools to interpret the data they 
contain. This is attributed to the fact that forensic tools can only process digital devices 
as independent monolithic entities. The problem that this paper addresses is the multifa-
rious interpretation and analysis of such evidentiary data in a uniform manner indepen-
dent of origination source and storage formats. A preliminary validation of the concepts 
has been carried out on a hypothetical case involving a single disk image. The develop-
ment of a prototype is planned as the next logical step to carry out a more comprehensive 
examination. This paper presents a conceptualization to how evidence integration can be 
achieved using content information from diverse evidence sources. 
To illustrate the significance of evidence integration, consider a hypothetical case 
where investigators seize a personal computer and a mobile phone from a suspect. In the 
context of the investigation, it is essential to analyze the data contained in these sources 
uniformly, irrespective of semantics and storage formats. It is imperative that such a 
forensic framework be developed to support data interpretation from multiple sources. 
Assume that on initial examination, investigators recover a set of suspicious docu-
ments which leads to the extraction of email messages exchanged between the suspect 
and suspect’s contacts. Irrespective of the location and type of storage (either on mail 
servers or on a personal hard drive as user client profile), the data derived reinforces 
support to existing evidence and hence must be added to the framework under the same 
case. 
Documents extracted from hard disks
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Fig. 1. An evidence composition example. 
 
The examination of email messages is expected to reveal some contact information 
and certain dates and times that might then be correlated with the current case to develop 
a social calendar of events and timelines. In addition, if the framework sources criminal 
records from a pre-existing repository that is indexed, then the correlation of extracted 
evidence with the repository can potentially reveal the underlying theme for the case, 
names and details of individuals involved, dates and times of activities reported or dis-
cussed relevant to the case. Such an extensive examination framework is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The framework aims to correlate (and hence compose) all reported information 
with the extracted evidence in an attempt to reconstruct the past. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, we review recent work in digital forensics and moti-
vate the need for a common framework. In Section 3, we introduce the forensic integra-
tion architecture. In Section 4, we present a sample case study using a hypothetical case 
to demonstrate how FIA will operate. We conclude in Section 5 with a brief summary of 
the work reported and provide scope for future work 
2   State of the Art in Digital Investigations 
Turner introduced the digital evidence bags (DEB) model [19] aimed at simplifying 
human interpretation. However, it is not intended to provide a methodology for combin-
ing different sources of evidence acquired at the various stages of an investigation 
process. Further, the model provides no scope for collecting and collating evidence from 
multiple digital sources which forms the crux of our work. 
Schatz and Clark proposed a representation model to integrate metadata with evidence 
information in the sealed digital evidence bags (SDEB) [16]. The SDEB assumes the pre-
existence of a forensic domain ontology model to support the representation of digital 
evidence. Such a model is yet to be developed. 
Case et al. [6] introduce the FACE evidence correlation engine that parses data from 
different sources and correlates them. However, FACE assumes availability of all evi-
dence sources at the start of analysis and the presence of known correlation in data. Be-
sides, the engine does not integrate semantic information from evidence sources or pro-
vide for developing and validating assertions based on evidence analysis. 
Alink et al. describe the XIRAF architecture [1] for indexing and retrieving stored 
digital evidence. The architecture indexes raw disk images and stores the content as an-
notated XML. However, XIRAF lays emphasis on feature extraction (indexing) and 
retrieval of digital evidence rather than on integrating evidence information that enables 
comprehensive forensic examination.  
There are several other works in the literature that have reiterated the need for a com-
mon forensic analysis framework. Garfinkel highlights the problems associated with 
forensic analysis of raw computer disk images [9] and calls for the need to maintain an 
open and extendable standard for forensic analysis. Garfinkel introduced the Advanced 
Forensic Format (AFF) which is a two-layered forensic file system providing abstraction 
and extended functionality. However, the AFF is tailored to suit hard disk images and 
doesn’t provide mechanisms to integrate evidence from multiple sources. 
The Common Digital Evidence Storage Format Working Group has re-iterated the 
drawbacks with current forensic analysis tools [8] in terms of not being able to cope with 
multiple proprietary image formats. The authors emphasize the need for introducing a 
common digital evidence storage format that is common to a variety of evidence sources.  
Beebe and Clark [2] argue the need for an objective based framework for digital fo-
rensics owing to the uniqueness of every forensic investigation. They divide the investi-
gation process into 7 stages and propose a 2-tier hierarchical objectives framework. 
However, the focus of this framework is to maintain evidence integrity at all stages of an 
investigation which merely complements our focus in integrating evidence information 
and enabling further investigative leads. 
Hosmer calls for the need to standardize the concept of digital evidence [11] to pro-
vide a common platform for investigators to perform forensic analysis. Since digital 
evidences can be altered, copied or erased, he proposed the 4-point principles of authen-
tication, integrity, access control and non-repudiation for handing digital evidence. 
Besides these efforts, several efforts in advancing the state of the art in techniques for 
data acquisition from electronic devices [5] have been reported. Some recent works have 
addressed challenges in the effective acquisition of volatile memory [14, 15, 17] and 
specifically in Windows based memory analysis in a computer [13, 18], while Buchholz 
and Spafford  have studied the role of file system metadata in digital forensics [4]. Since 
digital forensics has predominantly been reactionary, some research contributions have 
been reported in formal methods for event reconstruction [10] and building theoretical 
foundations [12] to digital forensics. Turner has applied the DEB model to selective 
imaging of hard disk drives [20] and Beebe and Clark [3] introduce a text string search 
engine in for thematic searching in digital evidence. 
The models and techniques described above have independently viewed the chal-
lenges in evidence analysis but are only stepping stones to integrate collected evidence 
from different sources. We require a framework that enables the development of new 
tools for interpretation of diverse data. Our work derives motivation from work reported 
in [8] and presents the FIA architecture as a means for abstracting technology depen-
dence of evidentiary data and integrating and composing information from different 
sources. 
3   FIA for Composing Digital Evidence 
We introduce a new architecture called the forensic integration architecture (FIA) that 
consists of 4 layers. The architecture is illustrated in Figure 2. The layers that constitute 
the FIA are: 
1. evidence storage and access layer; 
2. representation and interpretation layer; 
3. meta-information layer; and 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of FIA evidence composition architecture. 
 
The FIA architecture is consistent with forensic principles. Based on a preliminary 
version of Turners DEB model, the FIA architecture pads the layers with added functio-
nality that enhances its features and promises a natural transition towards automation. 
The layers are designed to allow scope for future extensions and selective modifications 
during analysis. 
3.1   Evidence Storage and Access Layer 
The evidence storage and access layer provides a binary abstraction to all data seized 
during an investigation. Acquisition of digital evidence is outside the scope of this work 
and the layer assumes that the evidence sources are forensically imaged copies stored on 
persistent media. All media must comply with read only semantics to maintain integrity 
of the data at all stages of an investigation. The layer supports registration interfaces for 
the acquired sources and their interpreters to be registered with FIA. Once registered, the 
layer guarantees forensically secure access to the registered media. The layer also ap-
pends case specific metadata information prior to commencing analysis. 
3.2   Representation and Interpretation Layer 
The types of data that the representation and interpretation layer will be capable of 
supporting hard disk images and memory dumps from various operating systems (Win-
dows OS, Linux, UNIX, Mac OS, etc.), network and system logs, and mobile devices 
with third party file systems (Nokia mobile with Symbian file system, iPod/iPhone with 
HFS+, etc.). The layer exploits interpreter semantics to extract logical blocks of data 
from the evidence sources for further analysis. For a file system image, this operation 
might correspond to extracting directories and files, for a memory dump it might corres-
pond to extracting process control blocks (PCB) from the various processes resident in 
memory at the time of imaging and for network or system logs, it might correspond to 
extracting records of entries and their attributes from the log files. The extracted blocks 
are passed to the layer above. Figure 3 is indicative of some types of evidence semantics 
that different evidence sources require. The functionalities of this layer can be mapped to 
the file system support provided by most forensic tool suites which interpret the clusters 
and sectors of a disk system (e.g., FTK, Encase, PyFlag, etc.). However, this layer has 
the additional capability of interpreting the contents from other digital media and sup-
porting memory and network forensics. 
3.3   Meta-Information Layer 
The meta-information layer supports application interfaces to extract metadata from 
objects present in the evidence sources. Every logical block of data extracted by the 
lower layer is represented as a file with properties that define its metadata. The meta-
information layer uses a known file signature repository to filter metadata content from 
these blocks. For example, in hard disk images, files and metadata carry their usual 
meaning. In memory dumps, PCB metadata might contain its allocated size in kilobytes, 
assembler type and process schedule information. In log file and packet capture sources, 
individual entry metadata might contain timestamps, process type, transaction source and 
destination and protocol information. Information such as the registered application ex-
ecuting a particular file is acquired while extracting metadata from file image. The func-
tionality draws analogy to the file interpretation capabilities provided by existing forensic 
tool suites while supporting a larger variety of evidence sources. 
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Fig. 3. Some types of evidentiary semantics used by different sources. 
3.4   Evidence Composition and Visualization Layer 
The evidence composition and visualization layer is responsible for integrating infor-
mation from various sources of evidence and composing the components into consistent 
and comprehensive evidentiary material for presentation to an investigator. This layer is 
composed of 3 sub-layers, content indexing sub-layer, cross referencing sub-layer and 
knowledge representation and reasoning sub-layer. The content indexing sub-layer is 
designed to index all syntactic content, such as keywords, locations, dates and time-
stamps, etc. in evidence sources and the cross referencing sub-layer cross references 
indexed data with entries in the FIA repository. This repository can be arbitrarily large 
and contain any external information that is deemed relevant to the case and be indexed 
in an identical manner. The knowledge representation and reasoning sub-layer is con-
cerned with the truth value of information and logical inconsistencies in evidence data. 
The complete layer decomposition is illustrated in Figure 4. While the illustration shows 
the three sub-layers stacked one above the other, we acknowledge the presence of signif-
icant interplay between them and no particular order is pre-conceived in their representa-
tion. 
3.4.1   Content Indexing Sub-layer 
 
The content indexing sub-layer supports mechanisms to index the logical blocks of da-
ta extracted by the lower layers. The indexing mechanism uses pluggable algorithms and 
pluggable contexts of keywords for indexing all syntactic content in data. The indexing 
process focuses on individualizing evidence, such as extracting and indexing names, 
locations, dates and events. We believe that such individualizations are crucial in any 
investigation and much sought after by investigators. This layer addresses the challenges 
involved in syntactic indexing and correlation of digital evidence across different 
sources. Once the data is indexed for each source separately, the indices are integrated to 



















Fig. 4. Illustration of evidence composition and visualization layer. 
3.4.2   Cross Referencing Sub-layer 
 
The cross referencing sub-layer is responsible for cross referencing indexed content 
with external databases to correlate evidence information with real world events. The 
sub-layer supports indexing a repository containing case relevant content databases using 
our evidence correlation model and cross referencing with data indexed from the evi-
dence sources. Such a repository is built over a period of time from several investiga-
tions. For example, it might represent the collective knowledge of the investigation team 
learnt over that period. The list of content in the repository can include online dictiona-
ries, automobile registration database, online map index database, calendar of dates and 
events and a database of social identification for individuals in a given area. 
 
3.4.3   Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Sub-layer 
 
The knowledge representation and reasoning sub-layer is concerned with the logical 
correctness of assertions and theories that are developed based on collected evidence. 
For example, consider a scenario where investigators discover simultaneous login at-
tempts by a user from Brisbane and Perth into a corporate mail server. The information 
renders itself to the development of two independent assertions “The user was in Bris-
bane at time X” and “The user was in Perth at time X”. Clearly, information regarding 
user login attempts themselves, either from Brisbane or Perth, cannot be held against the 
user. However, correlating semantic information regarding the simultaneous attempts 
from two different cities provides a suspicious flavor to the actions and warrants further 
investigation. This sub-layer enables the development of such assertions and validating 
their truth value based on correlating information from multiple sources which is an 
integral part of any investigation. Any evidence to the contrary is flagged and presented 
to the investigator in an appropriate form which constitutes visualization. 
4   Case Study – Car Theft Investigation 
To demonstrate the concepts introduced in FIA, we present a case study using a hypo-
thetical case concerning a car theft. The case was developed by Malcolm Corney at 
Queensland University of Technology as an assignment in a Computer Forensics course. 
The analysis of the case was carried out using existing forensic tools while following the 
FIA methodology. The true novelty of this architecture is described in Section 4.3. While 
the case contains only one disk image, we believe that the case involves sufficient diver-
sity to demonstrate the utility of digital evidence integration. The actual value of this 
architecture, however, is perceived only when multiple such images are analyzed simul-
taneously. 
4.1   About the Case 
The case consists of a disk image containing multiple file system partitions. The case 
revolves around a chain of email messages recovered from Google Mail using the Thun-
derbird Client. The image contains several pictures of Australian wildlife with stegano-
graphic content containing pictures of car models. These car pictures represent cars re-
cently reported stolen and currently under investigation. Each picture is password pro-
tected and the passwords are contained in an encrypted mail attachment. In addition, the 
disk slack space contains suspect’s personal mail account details and a car model se-
quence that is traced back to the sequence of car thefts reported. 
4.2   Extracting the data 
The disk was imaged using dd UNIX imager and the copy was hashed to preserve its 
integrity. The imaged disk was then registered under a new case with source and seman-
tics information. This action reflects the functionality of the evidence storage and access 
layer. The image was then analyzed using FTK to detect and extract files, mail drafts and 
inbox messages. These actions reflect the extraction of logical blocks of data from the 
representation and interpretation layer. The same tool was also used to extract file prop-
erties or metadata information from the files and wildlife picture files. PRTK was used to 
crack the password of the encrypted file which contained passwords to the steganograph-
ic pictures which in turn provided more metadata. In FIA, this operation is performed at 
the meta-information layer. These operations were repeated with Encase and Sleuthkit to 
corroborate the results. 
4.3   Evidence Composition 
Once all the relevant data is extracted, the evidence composition and visualization 
layer takes over and indexes content in the extracted logical blocks. In our case study, the 
chain of email messages was used as the main source to generate evidence composition 
as illustrated in Figure 5. The contents were then cross referenced with multiple databas-
es held in FIA repository to determine potential connections. Using directed keyword and 
metadata searches, an illustration of how FIA might piece the different sources of evi-
dence together is illustrated in Figure 6. The dates of creation of picture files produced a 
pattern that traced back to the dates in the email chain indexed previously. Metadata 
analysis of the pictures further revealed the use of a particular camera that was recovered 
from the suspect’s premises. The contact list from Thunderbird client revealed two per-
sons with criminal record history, when their names presented hits in a simulated police 
database. The car registration numbers were cross referenced with simulated databases 
containing automobile registration details to determine the owners of the cars and police 
complaint details to verify if a stolen complaint has been registered since the theft and 
whether theft details fitted the description. Further, an address recovered from the email 
content was searched for a registration log (again, added to the FIA repository) to deter-
mine if the owner of the premises had collaborated with the suspect to store the stolen 
cars until they were shipped offshore. 
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Fig. 5. Illustrating evidence composition for car theft case. 
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Fig. 6. Correlating data in car theft investigation using FIA. 
We have thus demonstrated the operation of the FIA architecture on a car theft case to 
perform evidence integration. FIA views the extracted data as conceptual sources, both at 
a syntactic and semantic level, and correlates information present in these sources in an 
attempt to reconstruct the past. In the process, FIA also aids the generation of further 
investigative leads that enable investigators to build a strong foundation for the case 
based on scientific evidence and facts. 
5   Conclusions and Future work 
In this paper, we presented the FIA architecture for integrating digital evidence from 
multiple evidence sources in a technology independent manner and composing evidence 
information. The architecture supports all requirements of forensic security. In addition, 
FIA also supports indexing content identified as conceptual sources and cross references 
them with a repository of internal and external databases relevant to a case. To the best 
of our knowledge, FIA is the only known work that attempts to integrate different sources 
of evidence and compose comprehensive evidence. The architecture is hierarchical and 
completely modular and extensible to keep pace with challenges that frequently crop up 
in this field. The model has been demonstrated with a hypothetical case study involving 
car theft. 
Future work will focus on the design and comprehensive validation of a prototype 
with real evidence data. Research is currently underway into developing data representa-
tion and effective indexing algorithms for content in FIA repository for evidence proper-
ty identification in different evidence sources. 
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